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The neo-institutional theory has been used to explain inter-organizational 
networks related phenomena from the economic and sociological 
perspectives. The political perspective has not been often used to study 
institutional contexts of networks. We aim to analyze the decision-making of 
the formal institutions in the internationalization process of firms in an 
emerging economy from a political bias. For the empirical field of study, we 
considered the Brazilian wine industry. Starting from a case study with twenty-
three interviews with representatives of wineries and entities of this industry, 
our paper furthers the understanding of how institutions influence the 
internationalization of firms in an emerging economy. Based on the political 
perspective of the neo-institutional theory, our study describes how 
institutions, mainly the government, can influence an industry. Government 
cannot afford resources to benefit or protect all the industries, as well as 
cannot provide incentives to all firms, and those that are supported will lose 
competitiveness. For the firms, the choices are based on trying to achieve 
economic advantages through political influences. For the institutions, the 
choices are based on political influences considering institutional strategies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Relationship networks was once a hot topic (Jarillo, 
1988). Over the past decades, it has derived into 
several research focuses: alliances (Gulati, Nohria, & 
Zaheer, 2000), social networking (Granovetter, 1973; 
Burt, 1992), learning (Anand & Khanna, 2000), 
innovation (Pittaway, Robertson, Munir, Denyer, & 
Neely, 2004), and governance (Provan & Kenis, 2007). 
However, there are very few theories related to 
decision-making, ethics, and motivation in the 
institutional context of inter-organizational networks 
(Cropper, Ebers, Huxham, & Ring, 2014). Networking 
may be contingent to “institutions such as the legal 
system, banking and finance system, education 
system, political system, and structure of the labor 
market” (Minh & Hjortsø, 2015, p. 212). 
Governments may play a role in stimulating 
institutions that positively influence firms towards 
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networking strategies (Edwards, Delbridge, & 
Munday, 2005). On the other hand, inadequate laws 
may hinder the strategic networks’ development.  In 
addition, there are few studies and discussion about 
how and why businesses are involved with politics 
(Grant, Coen, & Wilson, 2010) with rare exceptions as 
Sena, Lana, Marcon, and Bandeira-De-Mello (2016), 
Marcon, Lazzarini, Musacchio, and Bandeira-De-
Mello (2015), Brey, Camilo, Marcon, and Bandeira-
de-Mello (2014), and Musacchio, Lazzarini, and 
Aguilera (2015). At the most, economic theories 
identify the impact of the decision in some industries, 
as the neo-institutional theory, that indicates which 
industries have more influence on governments 
(Milner, 1997; Frieden, 1991). The neo-institutional 
theory with the economic (North, 1990) and 
sociological (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001) 
perspectives has explained the inter-organizational 
networks related phenomena. More recently, the 
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neo-institutional theory has been used combined 
with the industry-based and the resource-based 
views. This combination is defined as the institution-
based view (Peng, 2002). This perspective has been 
directed, mainly, to understand how the institutional 
mechanisms of emerging economies work and 
influence the performance of the firms with the other 
counterparts. However, in none of these theoretical 
perspectives, there is a prevalence of the political 
perspective of the neo-institutional theory.  
In this paper, we aim to analyze the decision-
making of the formal institutions in the 
internationalization process of firms located in an 
emerging economy under a political bias.   For the 
empirical field of study, we considered the Brazilian 
wine industry – specifically the wineries in the South 
of Brazil, the largest producer and exporter of 
Brazilian wine. Nevertheless, in an emerging 
economy, wineries do not represent the traditional 
internationalized industry. Our thesis is that 
institutions, from a political perspective, can 
influence an industry through the government. In 
emerging economies, the government has a bigger 
influence on the market structure, due to market 
imperfections or ideologies and political strategies 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 
2014) through protectionist measures or providing 
resources to the firms. Firms that do not benefit from 
these measures lose competitiveness. Firms must 
adjust to the development of multi-level systems of 
government, with political settings being one of the 
strongest influences on how firms develop their 
strategies. Winery firms have different sizes and 
experiences. In addition, wineries need formal 
institutional support to search for external markets, 
from the Brazilian Agency of Promotion of Exports 
and Investments (Apex-Brasil) and the Brazilian Wine 
Institute (Ibravin). Thus, this paper presents the 
guiding question: How do formal institutions make 
decisions to stimulate the internationalization of 
firms from an emerging economy? We considered 
the network of firms as an analysis unit, in order to 
establish an interaction between the studies of 
network theory and neo-institutional theory from 
political and economic tendencies.  
As the main contributions, our paper furthers the 
understanding of how institutions influence the 
internationalization of firms in an emerging economy. 
Our study describes the background of the wine 
industry, by presenting the formal institutions in the 
political perspective of neo-institutional theory, 
whether they are representative entities from the 
industry or wineries, regardless their sizes and degree 
of internationalization. In this scope, our study is 
justified by the relevance of the industry. According 
to the representative of the Brazilian Agency of 
Promotion of Exports and Investments – Apex-Brasil 
–, it has grown because of the project Wines of Brasil, 
which is one of the most successful projects among 
the more than 80 ones fostered by this entity. 
Moreover, the visibility of this project has furthered 
the socio-economic development of the region. In 
this paper, we address the theoretical assumptions 
supporting the neo-institutional theory from the 
economic and political power perspectives. Then, we 
describe the methodological aspects of the research 
design and detail the wine industry while 
contextualizing it in the international and domestic 
scene. Afterward, we identify wineries and entities 
that comprise the wine industry in Brazil. Next, we 
discuss the role of Wines of Brazil from a political bias. 
Finally, we present the conclusions of our research 
and indicate new issues to investigate.  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this study, networks are analyzed as complex 
relationships between firms from a political 
perspective. In the political perspective, institutions 
carry the legacies of political, social, and historical 
forces, forming institutional arrangements according 
to their temporal path (Theilen & Steinmo, 1992). The 
political institutionalists analyze the political formal 
institutions, legal codes, administrative norms, rules, 
and laws (Scott, 1995). In the economic perspective, 
we can highlight the idea of property right, the efforts 
to reduce transaction costs, and the actions of 
regulatory agencies (Hall & Taylor, 1996). From a 
strategic view, networks are firms that can be used by 
managers or entrepreneurs to make their firms more 
competitive in the long run, aiming at a competitive 
advantage (Jarillo, 1988). Our purpose is to integrate 
networks, considering them as power sources that 
can interfere with political and economic decisions. In 
the following, we present economic and political 
perspectives of the networks, by using institutions as 
background. 
2.1 Networks from the economic perspective of the 
neo-institutional theory 
Government policies are influential by providing 
economic incentives, creating protection 
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mechanisms in the domestic market (Sheth, 2011), 
besides driving the internationalization process of 
firms (Ramamurti, 2008). As firms strategically exploit 
the institutions to extract benefits (Martin, 2014), 
institutions generate restrictions on firms to reach 
their goals. These restrictions occur due to norms, 
requirements, and contractual mechanisms (Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008). This highly competitive 
environment motivates firms to enhance their 
performance, in order to ensure their survival or 
rewards (North, 1990). The institutions are more 
restrictive than inclusive. They impose control, limits, 
norms to individuals and organizations. Those that do 
not comply with the institutions are no longer 
legitimized and “are excluded from the game, 
because they are not willing to play by the rules of the 
house." 
According to North (1990), institutions play a vital 
role in the economy of any nation as institutions 
reduce uncertainty and become a reference to 
individuals. When institutions are inefficient, or the 
property rights are not guaranteed, an unfavorable 
environment for the success of these countries is 
identified. This institutional framework is more visible 
in emerging countries due to political and economic 
institutions that discourage productive activity. The 
level of political instability, government effectiveness 
and bureaucracy, quality of the regulatory system, 
the legal system predictability, and control of 
corruption are examples of this scenery (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008). 
In emerging markets, several factors are 
susceptible to the influence of the institutions. 
Economic and financial institutional risks implicate 
high levels of economic instability, exchange rate 
volatility, inefficiency of the capital market, and high 
inflation rates. It reflects on the investment levels of 
the firm, the market value, and the compliance of the 
consumer market (Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, 
Glennerster, & Khemani, 2006). 
We evidenced the institution relatedness, i.e., the 
degree of the institutional relationship established 
between a firm and the institutions of a country 
(Meyer & Peng, 2005). Typically, in emerging 
economies, relationships occur with great asymmetry 
of information, high costs of the transaction, based 
on political connections, reputations, and informal 
relationships, stimulating a diversification of products 
aiming to minimize risks. In developed countries, 
there are inverse characteristics that stimulate a 
reduction in the line of products of the firm, which in 
turn will base its source of competitiveness in the 
productive efficiency or through scope economies 
(Meyer & Peng, 2005). 
Child and Rodrigues (2005) emphasized the role of 
the government in promoting the 
internationalization of firms, especially in emerging 
economies. Most of the advantages of these firms in 
the domestic market (low operating costs, 
distribution systems, brands, customer, and 
government relations) are not transferable to foreign 
markets (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). The 
competition tends to be based on price, not on being 
as sustainable as technology or brand (Gammeltoft, 
Barnard, & Madhok, 2010). 
Massive government intervention in business 
activities is a common feature of emerging 
economies. Examples are taxation, regulation, and 
state ownership, mainly in key sectors: mining, 
energy, infrastructure, and financing. Moreover, poor 
disclosure, financial opacity, complex organizational 
structures, weak property rights protection, fragile 
political institutions, corruption, social tensions, and 
regulatory distortions are part of the institutional 
arrangement of emerging economies (Ball et al., 
2000; Ramamurti, 2012). The quality of government 
policies impacts emerging markets firms (La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999), mainly 
because bureaucrats and politicians can have self-
interests or be corrupts. This characteristic is 
enhanced in emerging economies, whose national 
economies have grown rapidly, where industries 
undergo dramatic structural changes, and whose 
markets hold promise despite volatile and weak legal 
systems (Luo & Tung, 2007). However, emerging 
economies cannot be generalized, because they 
include a diverse population of countries. In emerging 
economies, central and local governments are larger 
and more active than in developed economies 
(Gammeltoft et al., 2010). 
In this paper, we avoid using the conception of 
institution introduced by North (1990), by adding a 
political character to the discussion. Institutions are a 
set of formal or informal norms (followed by actors 
for material, cognitive, or normative reasons). 
Entities, as long-term firms, are formally recognized 
by their members, whose norms contribute to the 
political and economic institutions. The government 
of coordinated market economies has gained 
advantages, as business associations and trade firms, 
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to solve difficulties, as information asymmetry, high 
transaction costs, and conflicts of negotiation. Once 
independent of the government and responsible for 
their members, these institutions are in a better 
position to acquire trust, monitor relationships and 
transaction costs, impose sanctions, and coordinate 
agents (Hall & Soskice, 2001). However, the agents' 
compromise will be higher as they influence to punish 
the government because of any deviation from 
established agreements (Wood, 1999). 
2.2 Networks from a political perspective of the neo-
institutional theory 
The creation and implementation of policies result 
from the interaction between interests, objectives, 
and strategies (Scharpf, 1978). Political networks 
involve participating in networks' decisions and 
having power and access to the decision-making 
process. Regardless of how they are aligned, 
considering the culture of the industry, policies of the 
industry, and interdependency between the actors of 
these networks is relevant (Klijn, 2008). Through 
systematic interactions, players build the rules 
defining the institutional environment and the new 
interactions of the network (Klijn, 2001). This 
relationship is analyzed from the perspective 
between the government and the market and from 
the level of the firm. 
In a macro-level, from the perspective of 
government and market, the government determines 
the structure of the markets, mainly in emerging 
countries. Business results from the policies and laws 
created by governments that define the inter-firm 
relationships (Grant et al., 2010). On the one hand, 
there is the risk of inefficient allocation of resources 
due to political interests (Grossman & Helpman, 
1994) and information asymmetry motivated by 
power relationships. On the other hand, the 
information asymmetry can reduce costs to obtain 
information, uncertainty, and risk sharing (Grant et 
al., 2010). The government accepts this background 
because needs resources and profits generated by 
the firms. Therefore, it is necessary that the 
government attracts and retains business (Lindblom, 
1977), mainly through leading firms that enhance the 
compromise of business networks (Werner & Wilson, 
2008). Government plays a key role in fostering or 
inhibiting the global insertion of the firms. 
Governmental policies involve temporary 
protectionist measures through fees or entry 
restrictions (Lazzarini, 2015). It acts directly on the 
market through state-owned multinational firms. In 
this case, regulations can be applied in favor of the 
government and at the expense of other 
shareholders (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014). 
In a micro-level, from the analysis of firms, 
business associations and representatives of the 
industry create conduct codes, guiding the 
government practices. These are attempts to fill the 
gaps left by the government, creating a self-
regulation of the businesses through political 
influences (Dahan, Hadani, & Schuler, 2013). At this 
point, dominant actors influence the rules and the 
other participants of the organizational field, guiding 
the actions according to their interests (Fligstein, 
1996). The nature of the institutions and their 
environment influences the institutional strategies. 
By its turn, institutional strategies redesign their 
competitive positions according to the social 
structures that legitimize or challenge them to the 
group. Institutional strategies generate institutional 
leadership inside the organizational field (Lawrence, 
1999). We understand institutions as structures 
responsible for guiding or restricting the choices of 
agents, acting in a positive, negative, or indifferent 
way, aiming to influence its strategic decisions. 
Institutions affect the firms' decision and enable or 
hinder the process itself. This relationship affects the 
industrial competitiveness, according to the 
proximity of formal institutions and firms of the 
industry. On the other hand, it is a recursive 
relationship. It meets the interests of the 
government, aiming to correct market imperfections, 
provide resources or protection to some given 
industries. 
3. METHOD 
From the qualitative bias, our research focuses on a 
single case study with multiple analysis units. We 
chose this technique, because it comprises a 
complex, context-dependent phenomenon 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), with the networks being an 
adequate unit to be analyzed following the neo-
institutional theory. The case selected is the Brazilian 
wine industry, which is adequate because presents 
three aspects. First, it is in the early stages of 
internationalization with fragmentation in many 
business associations and governmental institutions. 
Second, there is the influence of formal institutions 
for network formation. Third, there is a high level of 
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heterogeneity between firms. Historically, the 
Brazilian wine industry is marked by aggressive 
strategies of competition in the domestic market. 
Recently, the increased competitiveness of Brazilian 
wines impelled the firms to foreign markets. 
In order to analyze the decision-making process 
under a political bias, of formal institutions in the 
internationalization process of firms located in an 
emerging economy, we divided formal institutions 
into wineries and institutional entities. We chose 
those wineries because they are members of Wines 
of Brasil, a project that aims to promote the Brazilian 
wine in the international market. We considered 
representation aspects in terms of quality and 
production of the exported products, in addition to 
pioneering in the participation in the Wines of Brasil. 
We divided the wineries based on some criteria. First, 
we categorized by entry strategy in foreign markets: 
direct and indirect export, contractual modes, and 
foreign direct investment. Second, we classified by 
the stage of internationalization, as not 
internationalized wineries; some experienced in 
international markets, wineries with a history of 
foreign operations, compared to other project 
participants. In addition, I interviewed wineries’ 
managers who did not join the Wines of Brasil. 
Similarly, regarding institutional entities, we 
interviewed representatives presenting relevant 
information on the Wines of Brasil and the 
internationalization of wineries. 
We applied twenty-three semi-structured 
interviews with supervisors, managers, and directors 
of export departments or winemakers of the 
wineries. From formal institutions, we interviewed 
managers, researchers, consultants, and industry 
executives, enabling data triangulation between 
different accounts of wineries and institutional 
entities. Examples of open questions were: i) 
grouping strategies and consolidation in the sector; ii) 
reasons for the internationalization, benefits, 
impacts, difficulties; iii) impact of internationalization 
to conquer the domestic market; iv) perception on 
formal institutions (private, governmental, class, 
mixed-source ones); v) institutions can affect the 
internationalization process of the winery (benefits, 
restrictions, relevance, difficulties). We recorded and 
transcribed all the interviews, generating a corpus of 
about 400 pages and 19 hours of recording of 
statements given by the respondents. We collected 
secondary data from electronic sites of the 
institutions and wineries to complement and contrast 
information from interviews and bibliographical 
material. Some examples were statistical data and 
research on viniculture to generate knowledge about 
the wine industry. We associated the interviews with 
the secondary data, our observations, and notes, thus 
enabling the data triangulation. This strategy helps in 
the more comprehensive analysis since it takes into 
account more than one source of information (Flick, 
2009). While dealing with primary data and 
secondary data, we aimed the data triangulation. 
Such procedures allowed obtaining more validity and 
reliability when collecting data at different times, 
from different sources or instruments in the study of 
one same phenomenon (Collis & Hussey, 2005; Stake, 
1995). 
Given the qualitative approach, we considered the 
validity and reliability of the method carefully. Thus, 
we based our interview script in three analysis 
categories. The first category is networks as a source 
of power. The second category is networks from an 
economic perspective. This category is networks from 
a political perspective of the neo-institutional theory 
(Table 1). We worked with these categories because 
we believed they were enough to describe the 
decision-making process adopted by wineries in the 
domestic market and, considering the support of 
institutional entities, furthered its 
internationalization. 
Tab. 1 
Analysis categories used for the interview script 
Categories Subcategories References 
Networks from an 
economic 
perspective 
Protectionist, 
contractual 
mechanisms, 
economic 
incentives, 
information 
asymmetry, 
transaction costs 
Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008; 
North, 1990; Hall 
& Soskice, 2001 
Networks from a 
political 
perspective 
Decision-making, 
power, political 
influence and 
interests, 
institutional 
strategies, 
institutional 
leadership 
Grant et al., 2010; 
Dahan et al., 
2013; Fligstein, 
1996; Lawrence, 
1999 
Source: Developed by the authors. 
We considered networks as relevant for sharing 
resources and results between the firms, providing 
opportunities and sources of influence and power. 
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From the economic and political perspectives, we 
considered the influence of institutions, as the 
government, on the networks and firms. For data 
analysis purposes, we used the content analysis 
technique in order to infer knowledge through the 
generation or not of quantitative indicators (Bardin, 
2011). We analyzed the data by preparing 
summaries, interview recordings, in addition to the 
printed and digital materials. In order to systematize 
this entire material, we used NVivo software 10.0 to 
code and categorize the data. Then, we constantly 
compared the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) between 
theory and results, leading to a priori and a posteriori 
analysis of subcategories based on the reorganization 
of the evidence provided by NVivo. This process 
enabled to rename some subcategories and exclude 
others, causing the emergence of the institutional, 
political decisions as dominant for strengthening the 
networks. Finally, the results furthered the discussion 
of the institutional influences on the strategies of 
inter-firm networks, taking the Brazilian winery 
industry as a research field. 
4. THE WINE INDUSTRY INTERNATIONALLY  
AND IN BRAZIL 
Traditionally, the wine producing market is divided 
into two groups. Countries in the "Old World" are in 
the North Hemisphere (Germany, Spain, France, Italy, 
and Portugal), which are nations with tradition in 
producing and consuming wine. Such countries 
reduced their world market share in the last years. 
Countries in the "New World" are mostly in the South 
Hemisphere (South Africa, Argentine, Australia, 
Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, and Uruguay) and the 
United States. These countries have stood out 
because of the variety of grapes cultivated, the 
technologies applied in the production of wine, and 
the relationship strategies they established between 
wineries. They raised their participation in the world 
market in production and commercialization and on 
sale levels. Following the division of the wine 
international commerce, a systematic movement 
towards the reduction of the international commerce 
participation took place in five representatives of the 
"Old World" compared to the six countries of the 
"New World." In the 1980s, countries in the "Old 
Tab. 2 
Wine production (excluding juice and musts).*** 
Unit: mhl 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Provisional 
2016 
Forecast 
2016/2015 
Variation in 
volume 
2016/2015 
Variation in % 
Rank 
Italy 42.8 45.6 54.0 44.2 50.0 48.8 -1.2 -2% 1 
France 50.8 41.5 42.1 46.5 47.4 41.9 -5.7 -12% 2 
Spain 33.4 31.1 45.3 39.5 37.3 37.8 0.5 1% 3 
United States 19.1 21.7 23.6 23.7 22.1 22.5 0.5 2% 4 
Australia 11.2 12.3 12.3 11.9 11.9 12.5 0.6 5% 5 
China* 13.2 13.8 11.1 11.1 11.5 11.5 0.0 0% 6 
South Africa 9.7 10.6 11.0 11.5 11.2 10.5 -0.7 -7% 7 
Chile 10.5 12.6 12.8 10.5 12.9 10.1 -2.7 -21% 8 
Argentina 15.5 11.8 15.0 15.2 13.4 8.8 -4.6 -35% 9 
Germany 9.1 9.0 8.4 9.2 8.8 8.4 -0.4 -4% 10 
Portugal 5.6 6.3 6.2 6.2 7.0 5.6 -1.4 -20% 11 
Russia* 7.0 6.2 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.9 0.0 0% 12 
Romania 4.1 3.3 5.1 3.7 3.5 4.9 1.3 37% 13 
New Zealand 2.4 1.9 2.5 3.2 2.3 3.1 0.8 34% 14 
Hungary 2.8 1.8 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.7 -0.2 -6% 15 
Greece 2.8 3.1 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.6 0.0 2% 16 
Serbia* 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 0.0 0% 17 
Austria 2.8 2.1 2.4 2.0 2.3 1.8 -0.6=5 -21% 18 
Georgia* 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.7 1.7 0.0 0% 19 
Moldova* 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 0.0 0% 20 
Brazil* 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.8 1.4 -1.4 -50% 21 
Bulgaria 1.1 1.3 1.8 0.8 1.3 1.3 0.0 1% 22 
OIV World Total ** 267.7 258.1 288.9 270.8 274.4 259.5 -15.0 -5%  
* Report of the year 2015, 2016 figures not yet available. 
** OIV estimate: mid-range estimate for evaluation of 2016 world production: from 255.0mhl to 264.0mhl. 
*** Countries for which information has been provided with a wine production of more than 1 mhl. 
Source: OIV (2016). 
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World" had almost 80% of the wine international 
commerce. Currently, these countries have up to 60% 
of this activity. During the same period, countries in 
the "New World," rose from 3% to 28.4% the world 
market share. This fraction was taken from the 
countries in the "Old World” and in the Northwest of 
Africa and Center-East of Europe. Individually, there 
is the superiority of countries in the Old World, with 
Italy, France, and Spain in the first three positions in 
wine production. Sequentially, countries in the New 
World have stood out (United States, Australia, South 
Africa, Chile, and Argentina) (OIV, 2016) (Table 2). 
Brazil is the 13th consumer of wine and the 15th wine 
producer in the world. Despite the industry's 
fragmentation, few firms concentrate most of the 
production and account for the internationalization 
of products that historically always competed based 
on leadership in the total cost. Only recently, through 
the creation and dissemination of an identity of 
Brazilian wine abroad, the industry begins competing 
based on differentiation of its products. However, 
obstacles remain to transform national wineries in 
internationally competitive firms, such as 
macroeconomics, climate, and coordination 
difficulties. Macroeconomic difficulties referred to 
changes in macroeconomic policies and an exchange 
rate. Climate difficulties affected the average annual 
growth of rain and high humidity. Coordination 
difficulties reflected the large industrial spray in small 
business and the large number of representative 
institutions in the industry (Farias, 2011). 
As in the grape cultivation, Rio Grande do Sul has 
more than 85% of the wine production in Brazil. 
However, only about 20% of those correspond to fine 
wines, with the others being table wines. 
Proportionally, Bahia and Pernambuco with the Rio 
São Francisco valley stand out. Even with an incipient 
production, 75% is directed to fine wines (Table 3). 
This region is one of the few regions in the entire 
world that allows for two harvests per year (Voltolini, 
2013). 
Wineries and entities represent formal 
institutions in the Brazilian wine industry. Only in the 
mid-XX century, with greater regulation of the 
industry, institutional entities of the wine industry are 
created to lay rules and regulations, typical of formal 
institutions. At the end of the last century, 
institutional entities are created, aiming mainly to 
encourage the internationalization of wine, based on 
product differentiation achieved with geographical 
indication and, recently, with the designation of 
origin. Thus, formal institutions play a critical role in 
the evolution and consolidation of the wine industry 
in Brazil. Moreover, through the relationship 
strategies promoted by these entities, based on the 
participation of wineries, significant advances in the 
internationalization of the firms were made. 
4.1 Wineries 
Historically, a diversity of firms characterizes the wine 
industry in Brazil. From the interviews, we collected 
the testimonies of four largest wineries – Salton, 
Aurora, Casa Valduga, and Miolo – in order to have a 
richer context to explore. Most of the smaller 
wineries were created in the 1970s. In the 1980s with 
the expansion of the Brazilian table wine, grape 
cultivation in family enterprises started in similar 
times. However, the difference between currently 
relevant firms is transforming the family activity into 
a business initiative while seeking the 
internationalization of its products. 
Dealing with the duality between family tradition 
and productive, commercial professionalism is the 
challenge of the wineries. The preservation of 
identity and family history differentiates the product; 
qualifying the grape growing process, production, 
and commercialization of wine adds value to the 
Tab. 3 
Estimation of Wine Production in 2012 (Lts.) 
 Non-vinifera wines Vinifera wines Total 
Rio Grande do Sul 214,359,363 52,822,277 267,181,640 
Santa Catarina 25,200,000 808,000 26,008,000 
Paraná 750,000 100,000 850,000 
São Paulo 4,000,000 100,000 4,100,000 
Minas Gerais 3,500,000 10,000 3,510,000 
Goiás 280,000 2,100 282,100 
Pernambuco/Bahia 2,000,000 6,000,000 8,000,000 
Total 250,089,363 59,842,377 309,931,740 
Source: Ibravin (2013). 
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wine. The winery owner must perceive that sells a 
product and a brand, an image, and in that image 
appears the whole a story that adds value to the wine. 
4.2 Institutional entities 
The Brazilian wine industry stands out for the large 
amount of representative institutional entities 
consolidated over the years. Institutional entities 
were created or engaged to fill the gap in knowledge, 
techniques, regulations, legislation. Such entities 
encouraged the growth of the wine industry in the 
South of Brazil. The first to engage was the Brazilian 
Corporation for Agricultural Research (Embrapa). 
Embrapa provided skills and knowledge to the 
farmers. The second was the Federation of Industries 
of Rio Grande do Sul state (Fiergs). Fiergs promoted 
the association of wineries in this industry. In 1998, 
the Brazilian Wine Institute (Ibravin) was founded. 
Ibravin goal was to promote a qualification work and 
promotion of the region, aimed at developing all 
production chain of grape and wine, providing an 
exponential evolution of the wine industry in Brazil.  
Furthermore, in 2002, the Integrated Sector Project 
Wines of Brazil was established through an export 
consortium organized by Fiergs. At that moment, it 
was composed by six wineries, Casa Valduga, Aurora, 
Lovara, Salton, Miolo, and De Lantier. That export 
consortium aimed to start the internationalization 
through planning, market researching and developing 
initial experiences in exports. The consortium 
promoted international courses, meetings, fairs, and 
events. In 2004, supported by the Brazilian Trade and 
Investment Promotion Agency (Apex-Brasil), the 
export consortium became an integrated sector 
project. Such integration started through an 
agreement with Ibravin, aiming to promote the 
Brazilian wine in the international market. 
Wines of Brasil supported 50 participating 
wineries in a range of aspects. Financially, Wines of 
Brazil supports by subsiding firm’s exhibition on 
international events. On knowledge, Wines of Brazil 
developed studies about target markets. On learning, 
Wines of Brasil trained people to act in the 
international market by agreements with service 
providers to sample, to understand customs 
clearance standards, to purchase air tickets, among 
other activities related to the external market. 
5. Wines of Brasil under a Political-Economic Bias 
Like other industries in the global agribusiness, from 
2000s global wine industry is characterized by 
increasing competition between economic blocs, 
especially business clusters based on intensive 
knowledge of technology and management. The 
participation of governmental actors is crucial, 
fostering strategic relationships between national 
firms and international markets, aimed at economic 
and social development of the wine-producing 
regions imperative (Protas, Camargo, & Mello, 2013). 
Firstly, the relationships network formed in the 
internationalization process – in most cases, through 
industry entities – helps in shaping marketing 
strategies for larger Brazilian wineries. Unlike firms 
operating only in Brazil, internationalized wineries 
can reach new levels of learning, transposing them 
into their domestic operations. Regarding this issue, 
 
Fig. 1 
Structure of the Wine Industry based on Wines of Brasil. 
Source: Developed by the authors. 
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actors can have objectives and access to different 
sources of power while shaping the collaboration 
according to their interests, in order to influence the 
results (Lotia & Hardy, 2008). The presence of 
Brazilian wines in foreign markets generates gains for 
the industry participants. There are exchanges of 
experience, learning gains, and expansion of the 
relationships network by contact with more 
experienced wineries and entities. In addition, this 
engagement between wineries and entities created 
strategic options, reducing the dependence on the 
domestic market. Another gain was the recognition 
by the Brazilian consumer as the national wine had 
prestige and international awards. Finally, the 
experience established new relationship strategies, 
highlighting the collaboration in foreign markets. 
On the other hand, we noticed in the Brazilian 
wine industry a division into numerous institutional 
entities that represent conflicting or converging 
interests. Ibravin, being an aggregating entity of the 
industry, seeks a rapprochement with other formal 
institutions towards a common goal, the project 
Wines of Brasil. This entity assumed the role that until 
then was Fiergs', but dealt with limitations for 
managing projects in many industries of Rio Grande 
Sul. At times, Wines of Brazil is mistaken for the 
proponent entity, Ibravin, due to its organizational 
proximity. If, on one hand, this can be positive, since 
Ibravin has an institutional leadership in the industry, 
on the other hand, management conflicts can occur, 
even though having similar or common objectives. 
The evidence is that the Brazilian Grape and Wine 
Union (Uvibra), in 2007, left the Deliberative Board of 
Ibravin, due to disagreement with the decision taken, 
but returned in 2009, according to the Office of 
Uvibra. Nonetheless, Ibravin was mentioned 
unanimously by wineries and other institutional 
entities as a formal institution with a positive 
influence on the internationalization process and 
within the project Wines of Brazil. Ibravin stands out 
in promoting a systematic and collective learning 
within the wine industry, through the systematic 
exchange of knowledge and experiences. For these 
results, it had to be legitimized among firms through 
a transition that was planned and conducted in a 
harmonious way. Hence, the entity would take over 
the management of Wines of Brazil, until then under 
the responsibility of Fiergs. Moreover, continuity and 
evolution of the results were essential for the 
institution to assume a leading position in this 
industry. These reports exposed institutional 
thickness in many senses. Firstly, there are strong and 
numerous entities. Secondly, there are high rates of 
interaction between entities and the region. Thirdly, 
there is evidence of the rising of dominant 
institutions and collective representatives by 
coalitions. Fourthly, there is evidence of the 
development of a mutual conscience (Amin & Thrift, 
1994). In the interviews, the importance of Apex-
Brazil is emphasized, especially for the financial 
support provided. In some cases, technical studies 
and knowledge brought to the industry, in particular 
for the larger wineries, were mentioned. In many 
emerging economies, central and local governments 
are in line with the priorities of firms, providing 
financial subsidies and other media (Gammeltoft et 
al., 2010). The central feature acquired by wineries 
through the Wines of Brazil is the knowledge of the 
steps of the internationalization process, generating 
a learning that is widespread within the network. This 
strategic resource starts with the grape growth within 
the standards recommended by the international 
market and continues the wine-making process, 
product commercialization, and marketing and 
internationalization strategies. 
Even non-internationalized wineries believe in 
Wines of Brazil and the actions being implemented, 
generating visibility in the international and in the 
domestic markets. Thus, while not participating in the 
Wines of Brazil, earnings are appropriated by firms 
with less investment capacity resources in this 
project. However, these benefits are restricted due to 
limited interaction within the network, with little or 
no interaction with the other institutional entities and 
other wineries (Figure 1). However, firms must deal 
with weak institutions in these markets, which are 
subject to protectionist mechanisms that incur higher 
transaction costs (Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008). 
Secondly, considering networks from the 
economic perspective, in the Brazilian context, 
internationalization is considered by smaller Brazilian 
wineries as an option, due to resource constraints. 
However, its international expansion increases its 
competitiveness in the domestic market, considering 
the learning and the recognition that the consumer 
attaches to exported wine. It decreases the 
dependence on the local market, creating strategic 
options and a more diversified customer basis. 
A major problem is the small-scale production of 
the Brazilian wine industry. Thus, there are 
opportunities for imported products, mainly for 
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countries with an export vocation in this industry, like 
the ones that are neighboring with Brazil. The 
representative of Don Giovanni mentioned the case 
of Chile, which exports 80% of the wine it produces, 
assuming a prominent position on the world wine 
scene. It is a paradigm for Brazilian wineries, 
especially the smaller ones, which compose most of 
the domestic industry. They must strengthen their 
brand and the image of Brazil through 
internationalization and fight for space in the local 
market. As an aggravating, there are bilateral 
agreements negotiated between countries. Such 
agreements are known as "basket of products" where 
tax exemption is offered for Brazilian imports. There 
is a reduction of aliquots on Chilean imports for 
Brazilian automobiles, pieces, machinery, electronic 
devices, and meat. By its turn, Chile got reduced 
aliquots to export wines, chemical products, and 
salmon to Brazil (ALADI, 2015). The interests of the 
government in political-economic, international 
negotiations do not always correspond to the 
interests of the firms. In this case, we consider the 
comparative institutional advantages of their nation's 
economy. Governments support initiatives that do 
not interfere with the competitive advantage their 
firms enjoy (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
A controversial issue, addressed during the 
interviews, was the safeguard clause.  According to 
the interviewee from Salton, initially the safeguard 
clause should create a protection only against the 
import of Chilean wines. However, the initiative 
caused a movement of the main importers against 
local wineries, as they felt under pressure. The 
interviewee observed that Ibravin delayed in taking a 
position, generating more dissatisfaction and 
uncertainties. The consultant at Aprovale agrees that 
this clause has not been sufficiently explained to the 
market. However, the low-scale production of the 
national wine industry could be compensated with a 
bigger offer of imported wines. It could stimulate the 
rise of the consumption per capita in Brazil. When 
withdrawing the safeguard application, the challenge 
is to redesign the relationship between producers 
and the retailer network, creating policies that can 
stimulate the marketing of domestic wine. There will 
have to be a greater cooperation between wineries, 
aiming to contemplate the industry objectives, 
instead of specific negotiations. 
Aiming to exhibit the main findings of our 
research, Table 4 shows quotes of representatives 
that are examples of discourses of the participants in 
the Brazilian wine industry. 
As the last, considering the political perspective of 
networks, we identified three main discourses based 
on several reports. Firstly, according to the 
representative of Embrapa, Wines of Brazil is part of 
a society that is not entirely qualified, in terms of 
human, financial, and logistical resources. Even with 
all incentives and benefits, non-compliance of the 
wineries is due to the interpretation as an elitist 
project that favors the larger wineries. This 
perception increases the gap between large and 
lower-production wineries. According to Lawrence 
(1999), the nature of the institutions and their 
environment influences the institutional strategies. In 
its turn, there is a redesign of their competitive 
positions according to the social structures 
legitimizing or challenging them before the group. 
Collaboration represents political movements of 
firms to protect their privileged positions and 
excludes the weaker interested parts (Lotia & Hardy, 
2008). It is evidenced by the fact that some smaller 
wineries admit not having organizational resources 
enough to be committed to the project. Thus, they 
choose to work only in the local market (Dal Pizzol 
and Casa Venturini). Secondly, according to the 
managers of larger wineries (Casa Valduga) or smaller 
wineries (Basso and Don Giovanni) — that already 
had exported —, there are programs for inserting 
smaller wineries in the internationalization process. 
Even with the restriction of resources, they face the 
challenges imposed by the internationalization 
process, but probably refute the practice norms and 
the political decisions in an institutional arrangement. 
Finally, a third vision, from a specialist in the wine 
industry, would place Wines of Brazil as a sort of 
incubator where larger wineries develop 
competencies. Through the development of sources 
of competitiveness, they would leave more resources 
to other firms. Nonetheless, through political 
decisions, it is important that Wines of Brazil has 
significant results biannually, so that the government 
renews their consortium and resources investment 
through Apex-Brasil. This occurs through the 
participation of large firms, even if they are not the 
ones most in need of resources. The power 
perspective in a network aims to reach their goals, by 
helping to function effectively (Gulati et al., 2000), 
even if they replace one part in detriment of another 
to keep the stability (Child & Faulkner, 1998). 
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6. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Based on our empirical study, we were able to 
analyze political influences in the decision-making by 
formal institutions in the internationalization process 
of firms located in an emerging economy. In this 
context, we observed how the institutions play a role 
in the decision of the wineries regarding the 
internationalization process. This happens when they 
allow the participation in fairs abroad, empower 
wineries to the activities of foreign trade, or develop 
market research and business rounds. Thus, we 
developed some contributions from this study. 
Firstly, as a managerial contribution, wineries 
understand that, even in a small proportion, 
internationalization benefits the industry as a whole. 
Internationalization brings visibility to the Brazilian 
wine, increasing the competitiveness of national 
firms, domestically and internationally. Dealing with 
Tab.4 
Discourse of the participants of Brazilian wine industry 
SUBCATEGORIES NETWORKS FROM AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
Protectionist "I believe that the attempt to sell the safeguard was not successful, (...) but it would have been important. 
I think what’s being done in Brazil is a counter-attack now. As we said, Brazil is a small global player. 
Consultant at Aprovale)  
Economic incentives "The sector (...) is still relatively fragile (...). It is too regionalized, concentrated, we depend a lot on the 
private initiative. So since it is not so representative of the Brazilian economy, the support sometimes, 
especially from the government, ends up not being enough. (Exportation Coordinator at Salton) 
"Today, if Aurora has reached so far is thanks to Ibravin. Along with the firms, of course, and the Apex 
sponsorship, right? [...] It is Apex that pays for the exhibition stands, installation. (...)." (Exportation 
Supervisor at Aurora winery) 
"I think the work of Apex, (...) gives an extra support to the exporter (...) Imagine if I had to make a market 
survey, in order to select which markets (...)." (International Relationships Manager at Miolo) 
"So we have the Apex support through Wines of Brasil, which is essential not only to carry out the 
resources but also the events through the resources, including the entire team that supports us, right? 
[...] If we had more resources, could we do much more things? Yes, we could do so much more." 
(Exportation Coordinator at Salton) 
 
NETWORKS FROM A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Decision-making power "The internationalization process (...) depends on (...) effort and investment, invariably. Why do I have 
small firms that have a large volume of exports? They don't receive much investment, but they have much 
effort, and this pays off, and this is very easy to analyze, why can't a larger firm export as much? Because 
although it receives much investment, it is not making enough effort into the business. So, I think that 
this is the balance. (...) obviously, a larger firm is either more involved, or it benefits from a larger number 
of actions and it is the one that stands out in the end." (Exportation Manager at Wines of Brasil) 
Political influence and 
interests 
"I think we have the large wineries, those that already have an established name, work in the 
international market, receive awards, and then we have the other ones. Among them, I think that there 
is a competition, but this competition is beneficial, anyway. I think we should be more open on the 
medium-sized ones (…) And what I know is that we are with Wines of Brasil. A brand is being 
established. Very good!" (Business Promotion Director at FIERGS) 
Institutional strategies  "The role of Ibravin (...) what they have to do is (...) make the firm get together and discuss the problems 
we face, for instance, we send projects to Brasilia, to discuss and to put the fiscal stamp, control the 
contraband, in short, this sort of things that are started out by Ibravin." (Exportation Supervisor at Aurora 
winery) 
"We work with Ibravin, but also directly with the firms. In general, our calendar of fairs is based on the 
demands of the sector [...] Once there was a culture in the State that it should only be impartial and that 
this impartiality was only given through the entities. (...) in practice, we have been noticing that entities 
sometimes disclose, but they also don't publicize the actions we do." (Business Promotion Director at 
Secretariat for Economic Development, Science and Technology of Rio Grande do Sul) 
"And this should be passed on to the national associations. We understand here that the legitimate entity 
that could sustain this project was Ibravin. It has Fundovitis, and other funds, which could complement 
any other existing activity in the Apex project." (International Relationships and Trade Manager at FIERGS) 
Source: Elaborated by the authors 
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competition against foreign wines, mainly South 
American wines, is apparently the major challenge. In 
the case of the wine industry, internationalization is 
induced by formal institutions to promote building 
relationships while leveraging learning within the 
network. Thus, firms acquire sources of 
competitiveness to compete in markets 
internationally. Non-market strategies (social, 
political, and legal arrangements) can be associated 
with the competitive forces in order to create 
opportunities for firms (Baron, 1995). Secondly, firms 
must adapt to the institutional changes in order to 
grow (Martin, 2014). One of these changes is how to 
obtain legitimacy in the domestic market and 
external market, moving from one to another 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). In the case of Wines of 
Brazil, the wineries seek to establish an image of 
Brazilian wine in the international market, adding 
legitimacy to the product in the domestic market. 
Institutions, in turn, increase the competitiveness of 
their firms through subsidies, protectionist measures, 
financial incentives, or organizational restructuring. 
Firms must carry out institutional arbitration with the 
support of institutions while avoiding structural 
deficiencies of the domestic environment and 
seeking advantages in the international market 
(Boisot & Meyer, 2008). 
Thirdly, as an academic contribution, as 
institutions, from a political perspective, can 
influence positively an industry, the opposite is true. 
The government cannot afford resources to benefit 
or protect all the industries, and cannot provide 
incentives to all firms. Those supported by this will 
lose competitiveness. Firms must adjust to the 
development of multi–level systems of government, 
with political settings being one of the strongest 
influences on how firms develop their strategies 
(Grant et al., 2010). Moreover, we must consider that 
such pressures do not pertain to all institutions in a 
homogeneous way. Institutions vary across different 
locations in the same country. Pressures are 
asymmetric too, depending on the origin, form, and 
objective of the pressure. Policymakers must 
recognize that what is good for the national economy 
is not necessarily beneficial for the institutional 
framework, because there are different ways to reach 
a goal. 
Understanding the duality for institutions to 
provide or not incentives for an industry is a challenge 
for scholars. Some authors focus on the role of the 
home country institutions and in particular on the 
role of government in shaping the process of 
internationalization of domestic firms (Ramamurti, 
2008). Our focus was on the motivations for formal 
institutions to foster the internationalization of firms 
in emerging countries. We analyzed the decision-
making process as a previous step in the choices of 
the industries and motivations of the industries. For 
the firms, the choices are based on trying to achieve 
economic advantages through political influences. 
For the institutions, the choices are made based on 
political influences considering institutional 
strategies. 
For future research, we suggest expanding the 
data collection in that industry. This study did not 
include all entities and wineries involved in the 
institutional environment. Another potential line of 
research is to explore connections between actors of 
this industry through social capital, considering both 
structure and quality of the ties. 
Despite our contributions, our study is subject to 
boundary conditions.  First, regarding the case study 
method, although it approached researchers to their 
study object, there is always the risk that it is just a 
mere description of the phenomenon, and it cannot 
be generalized to large samples. Second, the analysis 
was subject to the respondents' perception of the 
survey instrument, and that of the researchers in 
relation to the results obtained, which can produce 
failures or inferences. Third, institutional pressures 
are dynamic and asymmetric. We do not evaluate the 
dynamism of the institutional change and the 
evolution of the relationships between government, 
firms, and institutions. Finally, researchers must 
understand top-down models of institutional effects 
and the institutional process that incorporates 
institutional influence and firm responses (Scott, 
2001). Thus, we believe that our study is another step 
towards this path to be followed. 
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